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ABSTRACT 
We use two general equilibrium models to explain why changes in the external 
economic environment result in pro-cyclical aggregate dividend payout behavior. 
Both models that we consider endogenize low elasticity of investment. The first 
model incorporates capital adjustment costs, while the second one assumes that 
risk-averse managers maximize their own objective function rather than 
1 
 
shareholder wealth. We show that, while both models generate pro-cyclical 
aggregate dividends, a feature consistent with the observed business-cycle pattern 
of payouts from well-diversified portfolios, the second model provides a more 
likely explanation for this effect. Our findings emphasize the importance of 
incorporating agency conflicts when considering the relationship between the 
external economic environment and the financial behavior of businesses. 
Keywords: dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economies; payout policy; 
business fluctuations; firm objectives; capital adjustment costs 
JE: C63, C68, G35, E32, L21, E22 
 
1 Introduction 
The observed correlation coefficient between the real aggregate dividends paid by 
firms and real GDP in the U.S. has been around +0.50 for many years.1  This 
phenomenon suggests that the payout policies of businesses are systematically and 
strongly affected by external changes in the economic environment. However, this 
clearly observed aggregate dividend pro-cyclicality is inconsistent with the 
                                                          
1
 The observation period is between 1984 and 2010.  For more details, please refer to Table 
1 below. 
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predictions of large parts of the existing theoretical literature. 2  Many general 
equilibrium models imply that investors should benefit from holding a portfolio 
with counter-cyclical equity payouts (e.g., Alessandrini, 2003; Carceles-Poveda, 
2009; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). These predictions arise because, in economic 
booms, many potentially profitable investment opportunities are available to firms 
who wish to reinvest.  In addition, since the marginal utility of consumption is low 
during strong economic conditions, investors are less likely to depend on dividend 
income at this time.  
In this paper, we describe two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models to explain why external changes in the economic environment 
should result in pro-cyclical aggregate equity payout behavior. We model an 
environment where firms and households simultaneously undertake constrained 
optimizations and market clearing conditions ensure that the economy remains in 
equilibrium. As a consequence, dividend and investment decisions are made 
simultaneous and neither is a ‘residual’ of the other. 
In the first set of models, managers aim to maximize their current share 
price while firms experience capital adjustment costs. This follows an extensive 
literature that is based on the observation that managers cannot immediately and 
perfectly adjust their real investment decisions (see, e.g., Jermann, 1998; Boldrin 
                                                          
2
 This issue is distinct from optimal firm-level payout behavior, which is the focus of 
attention in much of the dividend policy research in financial economics; see, for example, 
Bhattacharyya (2007) for a review of that field. 
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et al., 2001; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006; Gershun, 2010; Santoro and Wei, 
2011). This investment friction has previously played an important role in 
explaining a number of asset pricing phenomena based upon DSGE models. Both 
Jermann (1998) and Danthine and Donaldson (2002) have exploited it to present 
potential resolutions to the equity premium puzzle.  Christiano and Fisher (1995), 
by contrast, apply adjustment costs to Tobin’s Q and show that adjustments costs 
are related to the cyclical properties of equity prices and investment goods.     
 
In our second set of models we assume that there are no frictions, but agency 
conflicts exist. Specifically, we assume that managers maximize their own expected 
utility function rather than shareholders’ wealth (see, inter alia, Radner, 1970; 
Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972; Carceles-Poveda, 2005, 2009).  This choice exploits 
the known similarity between models that incorporate risk-averse managers and 
those with capital adjustment costs. In particular, Carceles-Poveda (2003) has 
shown that, with appropriately matched parameter values, the equilibrium behavior 
of these two economies around the steady state is identical.   
A common key feature among these models is that they endogenize low 
elasticity of investment.  When this feature is combined with investors’ desire for 
dividend income as a source of consumption, more (less) money becomes available 
to pay out to shareholders in economic booms (recessions). This prediction is 
consistent with observed market behavior.  Thus, since both our models endogenize 
4 
 
low elasticity of investment, if one model predicts pro-cyclical dividends then so 
should the other; we confirm that here.  However, we also show that the cyclicality 
of optimal dividend behavior is clearly distinct between the two models and, as a 
consequence, each is not equally plausible as an explanation. We find that while 
the required level of managerial risk aversion falls at the lower end of standard 
ranges, relatively high levels of capital adjustment costs are required to explain 
observed payout and consumption behavior. This evidence suggests that the 
economy with risk-averse managers offers a more realistic explanation to the 
dividend pro-cyclicality phenomenon.  This conclusion is supported by the 
observation that the agency conflict model results are more robust to changes in the 
choice of parameter values.   
In order to test the overall performance of our DSGE models, we consider 
their explanatory power for a set of macroeconomic variables. This captures the 
pro-cyclicality and volatility of four variables: dividends, consumption, labor hours 
worked, and investment. The performances of the preferred specifications across 
the entire range of these diagnostics are the best amongst all the models considered. 
Resolving the anomaly of pro-cyclical aggregate dividends through either agency 
conflicts or capital adjustment costs comes with the additional benefit of increasing 
the overall ability of these models to explain the broader macroeconomy.   
This paper is most naturally compared with important recent studies by 
Carceles-Poveda (2009) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Carceles-Poveda 
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(2009) focuses on the sensitivity of aggregate behavior to household heterogeneity 
in an incomplete market economy both in the presence and absence of utility 
maximizing managers. Jermann and Quadrini (2012), by contrast, explain pro-
cyclical equity payments through economy-wide financial shocks. We present a 
number of new findings.  First, we show that the pro-cyclicality of dividends can 
be explained in simple agency-conflict models with representative agents and no 
frictions. Second, we demonstrate that agency conflicts are more likely to resolve 
the dividend cyclicality puzzle than capital adjustment costs. Third, we extend the 
representative household’s utility function to allow for the presence of internal 
multiplicative habit formation; a feature that generally makes household 
consumption smoother (see, for example, Constantinides, 1990).  Finally, we 
present detailed sensitivity analysis that demonstrates that the pro-cyclicality of 
dividends will emerge in the utility maximizing manager model for a wide range of 
plausible parameter values.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
economic environment of the utility-maximizing manager, the value-maximizing 
firms with capital adjustment costs, and the “basic” model that has neither of these 
features. Section 3 reports our findings and Section 4 concludes. 
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2 Economic Environment 
This section presents two economic models that can potentially explain the pro-
cyclicality of aggregate payout policy. The first model is based on a value-
maximizing firm with capital adjustment costs (VM-CAC hereafter), while the 
second one assumes that managers maximize their own objective function rather 
than shareholders’ wealth (UM hereafter).  We initially present the assumptions 
that both models have in common and then introduce the differences. 
 
2.1 The Firm and Household  
The tax-free economy consists of a representative firm that is all-equity financed 
with one share in issue and a representative agent. There are no other investment 
opportunities available and, with the exception of capital adjustment costs in the 
VM-CAC model, there are no frictions.3  
At any given time, , the output,  , from the representative firm is given 
by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on both the capital, 
, and normalized labor hours,	, employed: 
 
                                                          
3
 With the exception of all-equity financing, these assumptions are identical to Jermann 
and Quadrini (2012). 
  = 
f, x = 
x (1) 
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where 
 and x denote a stochastic technology shock and the deterministic trend in 
labor augmenting technical change respectively. The parameters α and 1 − α are 
output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively.4  The d superscript on   
denotes a firm’s demand for labor. The technology shock process is assumed to 
follow a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) in logs and evolves exogenously 
as follows: ln
 = ln
 +  , where  is the parameter of persistence and  
is an independent and identically normally distributed random variable 
~0, .  The representative firm also pays dividends,  , to equity owners: 
 
where  	is the wage rate and ! 	is the amount re-invested by the firm.5   By 
controlling for the initial inputs  and , other variables (equity payouts, output 
and investment) are simultaneously endogenized along with the household’s 
problem.  
Many DSGE models are built with a time-separable utility function, which 
assumes that the representative household’s preferences are independently 
determined by consumption and leisure in each period. In addition, the 
                                                          
4
 See also Jermann (1998) for more details on the specification of the firm’s production 
function. 
5
 See, for example, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Alli et al. (1993) and Baker and Smith 
(2006). 
  =  −  − ! (2) 
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representative’s utility that is derived from current consumption is independent of 
past consumption behavior. In line with Constantinides (1990) and others, we 
extend the utility function to incorporate internal habit formation.6 In this case, the 
representative household’s level of satisfaction from consumption is determined 
not only by current consumption but also by past consumption.  
Constantinides (1990) shows that this feature resolves Mehra and Prescott’s 
(1985) equity premium puzzle and generally results in smoother optimal household 
consumption patterns.    In this case, the household’s objective function #$, is: 
 
for 0 ≤ &, '; 0 < * < 1.		- is the consumption of the household,	* determines the 
time devoted to market activities (Campbell, 1994 and Cooley and Prescott, 1995), 
. 	denotes the hours worked, & determines the strength of the habit motive and ' is 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) of the household.  The s superscript 
on .  denotes the supply of labor.  /  is the time discount factor. Labor hours 
worked are normalized so that 1 − .  denotes the time available for leisure. 
                                                          
6
 See, for example, Constantinides (1990), Carroll (2000), Carroll et al. (2000), Dynan 
(2000), Boldrin et al. (2001), Seckin (2001), Otrok et al. (2002), Gershun (2010) among 
others. 
 Ψ$, = max34,546,74 8 9:/; <-=; − &-=;>1 − =;. >?@1 − '
A
;BC D 
      
(3) 
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In this framework, consumption comes from two sources. First, the 
household receives labor income of ..  Second, it can choose to hold 	shares 
in the representative firm.  Cash can then be generated from this equity holding 
both from the dividend  and by selling shares at the market price	E. The 
household budget constraint determines this price of equity: 
 
2.2 The Manager Objective Function and the Capital Accumulation 
Process 
Differences between the “basic” model, the UM model, and the VM-CAC model 
arise from the managers’ objective function, #F, , and the process that determines 
the evolution of capital within the firm.   
Managers have control over two variables (  and ) at any time, , to 
maximize their objective function.  In both the “basic” and VM-CAC models, the 
assumption is that managers aim to maximize shareholder wealth, E.  By contrast, 
following Radner (1970), Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972), among others, the 
UM model is based on the assumption that managers are risk-averse and act in a 
way that satisfies their own personal objective function rather than maximizing the 
share price of their firm. Carceles-Poveda (2005, 2009) shows that the risk aversion 
 C =  . +  +  − E. (4) 
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assumption improves our understanding of managers’ behavior. We summarize the 
manager’s objective function as: 
where 'F is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the manager and H is the 
subjective discount factor. This is an appropriate utility function if managers’ 
income comes solely from income derived from the ownership of equity in his/her 
own firm.7 There is some support for this from studies, which show how poorly 
diversified entrepreneur’s portfolios often are; e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000).  
Alternately, we might imagine that the manager is rewarded though a salary and 
bonus policy that is linked to the firm’s dividend payouts. This managerial utility 
function has previously been used by Carceles-Poveda (2003).  
The second key difference between the “basic” model, the UM model, and 
the VM-CAC model is related to the capital accumulation process.  In the “basic” 
and UM models, the capital employed in the firm develops according to  =
                                                          
7
 While, under this assumption, the manager’s salary comes entirely from dividends, it is 
also necessary to assume that the manager holds an infinitesimally small fraction of the 
equity.  This is because, within this model, all dividends go to the household.  We thank an 
anonymous referee for this point.   
  
ΨF, = IJK
JLmax54M,N4 8 9:H; =;
@O − 11 − 'F
A
;BC D ,																																						UMmax54M,N4E	,																																																														VM − CAC
 
 
 
 
(5) 
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1	 − 	T	 +	!, where T denotes the capital depreciation rate.  By contrast, in 
the VM-CAC model, the capital accumulation process is given by 
where U· is a concave capital adjustment cost function and ζ determines the level 
of capital adjustment costs. Given this economic friction, the elasticity of 
investment is expected to be lower than in a model without CAC.  Specifically, we 
follow Gershun (2010) and set 
Notice that, the lower the value of  ζ, the higher the capital adjustment cost.  
Ultimately, as X → ∞, the capital adjustment cost goes to zero and the VM-CAC 
model becomes the “basic” model.  We refer to this last case as the “VM-no-CAC 
model”.   
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions 
General equilibrium exists in this economy when both the firm and the household 
are able to simultaneously maximize their objective functions. This leads to five 
first-order conditions that can be algebraically rearranged to give: 
  = 	 1	 − 	T	 + 	U!	, , T	, ζ	 (6) 
 U!, , T, X = T/\1 − 1X ]
!^/\ + T1 − X	. (7) 
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where _=; = `ab,4`34cd/`ab,4`34 	 is the household’s inter-temporal marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption between times  and  + ℎ. Notice that the last of these 
equations is just the standard Euler equation that is used widely in asset pricing. 
In addition to these conditions, labor and capital markets must clear. This 
leads to three further constraints.  First, the supply and demand of labor must be 
equal, . =  .  Second, the firm has one share in issue at all times,  = 1.  
Finally, output must be either consumed or re-invested,  = - + !. 
To simultaneously solve this set of six equations, we use Dynare software 
in conjunction with Matlab. This allows us to determine the steady state growth 
rates of several underlying macroeconomic and financial variables, together with a 
  
1 =
IJJ
KJ
JL 8 fH ] =^@O ]
= ghg + 1 − T^i , UM
gUg! 8<_=? j
= ghg + 1 − T + U + 
gUg gUg! k , VM − CAC
 
 
 
 
 
(8) 
   = 1 − l  (9) 
 E = 8<_=E= + =? (10) 
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variance-covariance matrix of the growth rates of each of these variables, and 
impulse response functions.8 
2.4 Calibration 
This subsection describes the parameter values used in our baseline calibrations. 
Further evidence on the sensitivity of our results to the parameter values is provided 
in subsection 3.1. 
For the Cobb-Douglas production function, the values of the capital 
elasticity of output l = 0.36, the depreciation rate T = 0.025, and the quarterly 
trend in labor augmenting technical change x = 1.005 are taken from Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) and Jermann (1998). These values are also commonly used in long-
term economic and finance models (e.g. Hansen, 1985; Campbell, 1994; Jermann, 
1998).  In line with Hansen (1985), the stochastic technology shock (
) follows an 
AR(1) process with a persistence parameter  = 0.95 and standard deviation  =0.00712. 
For the household, we choose / = 0.99, which is standard in the literature 
(e.g. Hansen, 1985; Prescott, 1986; Campbell, 1994; and Jermann, 1998).  We 
follow Carceles-Poveda (2003) by setting ' = 1.44.  The value of ' falls within the 
1 to 5 range, which is again generally considered reasonable by many economists 
(e.g. Jermann, 1998; Carceles-Poveda, 2003; and Gershun, 2010).  In the sensitivity 
                                                          
8
 The impulse response functions are available on request from the authors. 
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analysis, we vary ' between 0 and 100.  The estimated value of the agent’s internal 
consumption habit persistence parameter & = 0.82  is equivalent to the figure 
estimated by Jermann (1998). The value * = 0.36 for the time devoted to market 
activities is obtained from Campbell (1994).9 
Following Carceles-Poveda (2003), we set manager’s stochastic subjective 
discount factor to	H = 0.99. We also set the manager’s risk aversion coefficient to 
'F 	= 1.25 and 5 to indicate low and high levels of risk aversion, respectively.  
Both these risk aversion values lie within the one to five range that many 
economists consider to be realistic (e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004; Parrino et 
al., 2005; and An and Cheung, 2010).  We also vary this figure between 0 and 100 
to examine the sensitivity of dividend cyclicality to the manager’s degree of risk 
aversion.   
In the VM-CAC economy, the parameter value determining capital 
adjustment costs is set to (1) X = 40 for relatively low capital adjustment costs 
                                                          
9
 Because of the concavity of the CAC function, it is more costly to adjust the investment-
to-capital ratio upwards than adjust it downwards. It should be noted that CACs are not 
always considered in the function of capital accumulation but can instead be captured in 
the goods clearing condition. This is because some scholars assert that the influence of 
capital adjustment costs is on the amount of output, not the amount of capital.  For the case 
of not putting capital adjustment costs in the capital accumulation process, see Danthine 
and Donaldson (2002).  For papers considering capital adjustment costs in the function of 
the capital accumulation process, see, for example, Danthine and Donaldson (2002), 
Canzoneri et al. (2006), Collard and Dellas (2006) and Gershun (2010). 
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following Gershun (2010) and (2) X	 = 0.30 for relatively high capital adjustment 
costs, which is similar to the value used by Jermann (1998).    
 
3 Results 
We report the results for six models, each both with (& = 0.82 and without (& =
0 household habit formation, giving a total of twelve models. The first is the 
“basic” VM-no-CAC economic framework with no capital adjustment costs and a 
manager who aims to maximize shareholder wealth; this is the standard DSGE 
model.  The next three models are for the utility maximizing (UM) manager with 
different levels of risk aversion; risk neutrality 'F = 0	 and both low 'F =1.25	and high 'F = 5	risk aversion.  The final two models are low (X = 40) and 
high (X = 0.30) capital adjustment cost VM-CAC models. 
In Table 1 we report eight summary statistics for each model. These refer 
to the cyclicality and volatility of dividends, consumption, labor hours, and 
investment.  The former considers the correlation between the growth of each 
variable and GDP growth.  The latter is the standard deviation of each variable after 
it has been normalized by GDP.  This table also reports the observed U.S. 
16 
 
macroeconomic statistics from 1984:1 to 2010:2, with all data detrended with a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter.10   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
It is clear that the basic VM-no-CAC model fails in a wide variety of ways.  
Most crucially from this paper’s perspective, optimal equity payout behavior is 
predicted to be strongly counter-cyclical; -0.96 and -0.98 in the presence and 
absence of habit formation, respectively.  This feature has also been reported in 
prior studies (see, for example, Alessandrini, 2003; Carceles-Poveda, 2009 and 
Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). However, this finding contrasts sharply with 
observed payout policy, which indicates a correlation between real equity payouts 
and real GDP of +50% for the period 1984:1-2010:2. For the other three variables, 
the predicted correlation is relatively close to the observed levels, except for 
consumption when the household has a habit formation utility function. The basic 
                                                          
10
  The data we use are taken from Jermann and Quadrini (2012)’s technical appendix 
which is online at the American Economic Review website.  Their data are obtained from 
the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board (FFA) and the National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA).  Real GDP and consumption of non-durables and services 
are obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.3. Equity payout is the net value of “net dividends 
(Nonfinancial Corporate Business, F.102, line 3) minus the total of “net new equity issue” 
(Nonfinancial Corporate Business (F.102, line38).  All data are seasonally adjusted and 
detrended with a band-pass filter that preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years with 12 lags suggested 
by Baxter and King (1999).  The band-pass filter codes can be found at Kanda Naknoi’s 
website:    http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/knaknoi/Econ635/matlab_filter.html.   
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model also predicts dividends that are too volatile, while consumption, investment 
and labor hours are too smooth. Changing the model to incorporate a risk-neutral 
manager only makes matters worse for a number of diagnostics, including the fact 
that consumption is now predicted to be countercyclical.  
When we introduce either (i) relatively low levels of risk aversion for 
managers, 'F = 1.25, and a household either with or without habit formation, or 
(ii) high capital adjustment costs, X = 0.30, when investors have habit formation, 
then we derive a much better understanding of dividend cyclicality. In each case, 
the correlation between equity payout growth with GDP growth is extremely 
similar to that observed in the real data. This is consistent with Carceles-Poveda 
(2009) for the UM model, although we do not rely here on incomplete markets and 
heterogeneous agents.   
The intuition behind this result is that, as shown by Carceles-Poveda (2003), 
with either risk-averse managers or CAC, investment becomes less volatile.  In 
economic booms, risk-averse managers may be less inclined to place money in 
projects with uncertain future equity payouts in case the state of the economy 
changes while high capital adjustment costs make it less attractive for managers to 
re-invest. These arguments suggest that firms may have more incentive to pay out 
cash in the form of dividends when profits are high, which helps reconcile the 
theory with the observed data.   
18 
 
We further notice from Table 1 that the cyclical behavior of equity payouts 
is sensitive to managerial risk aversion and CAC. With low CAC, for example, 
optimal equity policy remains countercyclical, while for high levels of managerial 
risk aversion, optimal dividend policy is too pro-cyclical. We therefore concentrate 
on three models:  low levels of managerial risk aversion ('F = 1.25) both with and 
without habit, and high CACs (X = 0.30) with habit.   
When considering the broader macroeconomy, each of these three models 
has different strengths and weaknesses.  The presence of habit formation helps to 
better explain the volatility of hours worked but cannot capture this variable’s pro-
cyclicality.  The VM-CAC model captures better the volatility of dividend 
payments when compared to the UM specifications.  By contrast, the UM models 
slightly better explain the volatility of investment, although this remains too low in 
all cases. 
Given the differences in performance of the twelve different models across 
each of the eight diagnostics considered, we construct three meta-statistics to better 
understand their relative overall performance.  First, for each model, we calculate 
the average absolute difference between the predicted and observed correlations 
between dividends, consumption, labor hours and investment with GDP.  This 
average is termed the “Correlation Error”.  We also calculate the absolute difference 
between the predicted and observed standard deviation of these variables when 
normalized by GDP.  These are then standardized by the observed standard 
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deviation in each case before being averaged; this is referred to as the “Standard 
Deviation Error”.  The final meta-statistic, “Total Error”, for each model is then the 
average of the correlation and standard deviation errors.  Results are reported in 
Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
We can see that five models perform poorly as they are in the bottom half 
of all specifications for all three of the meta-statistics.  Worst of all are the utility-
maximizing models when it is assumed that the firm manager is risk-neutral. The 
basic model, with neither capital adjustment costs nor agency problems, also 
performs poorly. Finally the habit formation, VM-CAC model with low adjustment 
costs, can clearly be rejected by the data.  Five other models, by contrast, are in the 
top half for each of the three meta-statistics. These include all four of the UM 
models with risk averse managers, and the VM-CAC model with high capital 
adjustment costs and a representative household with habit formation utility.   
The three models that we have particularly shortlisted for consideration, 
given their high ability to explain the correlation between dividend and GDP 
growth, feature in the top three positions according to the total error statistic. They 
also feature first, second on fifth on the standard deviation error statistic, even 
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though their ability to explain volatility was not a criterion for their selection. From 
this it is clear that including either capital adjustment costs or a value-maximizing 
risk-averse manager makes a material improvement on the standard economic 
model across a wide range of metrics covering volatility and covariance. For the 
UM model, this finding is not particularly sensitive to either the level of risk 
aversion of the manager (although the low risk aversion manager specification is 
preferred), or the presence or absence of household habit formation. The UM, mild 
risk aversion, with habit model is perhaps of particular note as it lies within the top 
three models for all of the meta-statistics considered.   
3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In Figures 1 and 2, we explore the sensitivity of dividend cyclicality to the choice 
of 'F  and X for different levels of '. For the UM model, the results are largely 
insensitive to '.  The pro-cyclicality of equity payouts declines steeply with 'F <1.25, but, above this level, equity payouts quickly become highly pro-cyclical at a 
relatively steady level.  For the VM-CAC model, there is greater sensitivity of the 
results with respect to ', especially when X < 10.  Our baseline calibration value 
of ' = 1.44 is at the lower end of standard estimates. With higher values of ', an 
even higher capital adjustment cost is required to explain the observed pro-
cyclicality of payout policy. 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Insert Figures 1 & 2 around here 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Results detailing the sensitivity of dividend and consumption pro-
cyclicality to a wide range of plausible parameter values are presented in Tables 3 
(for the UM model) and 4 (for the VM-CAC model).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 & 4 around here 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
For the UM model with 'F = 1.25, there is relatively low sensitivity of the 
correlation between dividends and output for most parameters considered (l, T, &, 
x, * and ) and aggregate consumption is positively related to output in all cases, 
with this relationship becoming stronger when the manager becomes more risk-
averse ('F=5).  The pro-cyclicality of dividends is, however, sensitive to the 
stochastic time discount factor (/) and the persistence of technology shocks (). 
As expected, dividends are more pro-cyclical when technology persistence 
becomes stronger, except potentially in the case of extremely risk averse managers.  
As the rate of pure time preference increases (/  decreases), the relationship 
between output and dividends becomes less positive.    
The VM-CAC model is more sensitive to parameter choices than the UM 
model.  Dividends can become negatively related to output not only with low CAC 
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but also in the case of high CAC in the presence of relatively strong habit 
persistence or low persistence of technology shocks. In addition, aggregate 
dividends in the VM-low-CAC model are not as sensitive to parameter choices as 
in the VM-high-CAC model. Aggregate dividends become less positively related 
to output when the time discount factor, habit persistence, the elasticity of 
consumption, and the depreciation rate are high and when the persistence of 
technology shocks is low.   
While we have been able to reconcile observed behavior with general 
equilibrium using either the UM or VM-CAC models in economies without 
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets, we believe that the former is more 
realistic than the latter. An estimate of 'F = 1.25  is broadly consistent with 
standard estimates of risk aversion. By contrast, the level of capital adjustment cost 
implicit in the X = 0.30 case is very large. Taking as an example a firm that wishes 
to invest 5% of new capital into its firm: !/ 	= 0.05. If X = 0.30, then, from 
Equation 7, only 0.0336	makes its way into the firm and the rest is lost to 
frictions. This means that only two-thirds of the money re-invested becomes 
effective. With lower levels of CAC, the model has lower explanatory power. 
Further, the explanatory power is more robust to parameter value changes for the 
UM model than the VM-CAC model. 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have described two general equilibrium models that explain why 
external changes in the economic environment result in businesses systematically 
implementing pro-cyclical equity payout policies. This resolves an anomaly that is 
present in many previous general equilibrium studies.  In addition, our more 
sophisticated models are able to capture a number of other features of the observed 
macroeconomy that are poorly captured by a basic DSGE framework. 
Our preferred model is based on the assumption that managers maximize 
their own objective function rather than the share price of their firms. This makes 
them more reluctant to re-invest in the business in economic booms in case 
conditions change. More cash can then be paid out when times are good. Even with 
relatively low levels of managerial risk aversion, the calibrated theoretical model 
matches the summary statistics of historical data well. 
An alternative model that we have analyzed includes capital adjustment 
costs within an economy where managers maximize their current share price. These 
frictions also inhibit managers from heavily re-investing in a pro-cyclical manner, 
and the resultant payout policy moves in line with the economy. However, in this 
case, the level of capital adjustment costs needs to be high to accurately calibrate 
the model in a manner that is consistent with the data and therefore we believe this 
is the less credible explanation of the payout pro-cyclicality anomaly.  These 
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findings support the idea that agency conflicts play an important role in real 
business cycle models.   
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Fig. 1. The correlation (Z axis) between equity payouts and output growth in the 
utility-maximization (UM) model across various levels of risk aversion of the firm, 'F (X axis) and the household, ' (Y axis).  The value of risk aversion ranges from 
zero (risk-neutral) to one hundred (extremely risk-averse). 
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Fig. 2. The correlation (Z axis) between equity payouts and output growth in 
the value maximization (VM-CAC) model across various levels of capital 
adjustment costs (X axis) and risk aversion of the household, '  (Y axis).  The 
variable X on the X axis determines the level of capital adjustment costs; the lower 
the value of  X, the higher the costs. 
Table 1   
Modeled and observed summary statistics for the macroeconomy 
Note: This table shows the predicted values of (i) the correlation between the growth of each variable (dividends, consumption, hours 
worked and investment) and GDP growth, (ii) the standard deviation of each variable, normalized by GDP and (iii) the observed value of 
each variable from the US economy.   
a See notes to Footnote 10. 
  
 Baseline Models  Advanced Specifications  
 
 
US 
Dataa 
 
(1984:1
-
2010:2) 
 
With/without habit 
 
Model type 
No 
Habit 
 Habit 
 
No Habit 
 
Habit 
VM VM UM UM UM VM-CAC 
VM-
CAC UM UM UM 
VM-
CAC 
VM-
CAC 
Model 
specification 
No-
CAC 
 No-
CAC 
 Risk 
Neutral 
Mild  
risk-
averse 
('F=1.25) 
Strong  
risk-
averse 
(γv=5) 
Low 
CAC 
(X=40) 
High 
CAC 
(X=0.30) 
 Risk 
Neutral 
Mild  
risk-
averse 
(γv=1.25) 
Strong  
risk-
averse 
(γv=5) 
Low 
CAC 
(X =40) 
High 
CAC 
(X=0.30) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Correlation with GDP 
       Dividends -0.98  -0.96  -0.95 0.50 0.90 -0.98 1.00  -0.99 0.55 0.86 -0.95 0.55 0.50 
       Consumption 0.94  0.51  -0.85 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00  -0.08 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.97 0.97 
       Hours worked 0.98  0.98  0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 -1.00  0.97 -0.23 -0.22 0.98 -0.56 0.84 
       Investment 0.99  0.98  0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00  0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.78 0.88 
Standard deviation                 
       Dividends 3.87  5.47  14.08 0.12 0.08 3.52 2.39  6.35 0.14 0.10 5.36 2.18 1.30 
       Consumption 0.35  0.26  1.18 0.87 0.87 0.41 1.19  0.15 0.87 0.87 0.27 1.06 1.92 
       Hours worked 0.46  0.41  1.41 0.09 0.09 0.42 0.13  1.45 1.86 1.89 0.36 1.83 1.56 
       Investment 2.95  3.58  7.04 1.38 1.38 2.81 0.44  3.96 1.37 1.37 3.53 1.18 5.99 
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Table 2  
Meta-statistics on model performance 
    Correlation Standard 
Dev 
Total  Correlation Standard Dev Total 
Model Specification Habit?  Error Error Error  Ranking Ranking Ranking 
UM Mild risk-aversion No habit  0.076 0.793 0.435 
 1 5 1 
VM-CAC High CAC Habit  0.388 0.524 0.456 
 4 1 2 
UM Mild risk-aversion Habit  0.318 0.601 0.459 
 3 2 3 
UM Strong risk-aversion No habit  0.178 0.801 0.489 
 2 6 4 
UM Strong risk-aversion Habit  0.393 0.612 0.503 
 5 3 5 
VM-CAC Low CAC No habit  0.436 0.938 0.687 
 6 7 6 
VM-CAC High CAC No habit  0.622 0.764 0.693 
 10 4 7 
Basic (VM No-CAC)  No habit  0.440 1.003 0.722 
 7 8 8 
VM-CAC Low CAC Habit  0.528 1.289 0.908 
 8 9 9 
Basic (VM No-CAC)  Habit  0.540 1.303 0.921 
 9 10 10 
UM Risk Neutral Habit  0.697 1.305 1.001 
 11 11 11 
UM Risk Neutral No habit  0.869 2.622 1.746 
 12 12 12 
Note: This table reports each model’s performance by ranking correlation errors, standard deviation errors and total errors of all models. 
Table 3  
Sensitivity analysis for UM model 
 'F = 1.25   'F = 5 //F (the stochastic time discount factor)          
 0.100 0.500 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999  0.100 0.500 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 
corr(d,y) 1.00 0.97 0.59 0.55 0.46 0.29  1.00 0.97 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.49 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    
 
      
 
  l (output elasticity of capital) 
 0.09 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65   0.09 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65 
corr(d,y) 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.63  0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
              
x (the quarterly trend growth rate of effective labor) 
 1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00  1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
              T (the depreciation rate, note that we assume the calibration is in a quarterly model) 
Annual rate 0.010 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.400  0.010 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.400 
Quarterly rate 0.003 0.013 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100   0.003 0.013 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 
corr(d,y) 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.65  0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
   
 
      
 
    (the persistence of time-series technology shocks) 
 0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00  0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 
corr(d,y) 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.55 0.73 0.82  0.53 0.53 0.73 0.86 0.80 0.61 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 
                0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100  0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
              & (habit persistence) 
 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99  0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 
corr(d,y) 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.56  0.90 0.91 0.92 0.86 0.75 0.30 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
              * (time devoted to provide labor) 
 0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99   0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99 
corr(d,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.51  0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.91 
corr(c,y) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: This table reports the correlations of the growth of dividends and consumption with GDP 
growth by varying the range of the parameter values for the UM model.  
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Table 4   
Sensitivity analysis for VM-CAC model 
 
X = 40  X = 0.30 //F (the stochastic time discount factor) 
 0.900 0.970 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999  0.900 0.970 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.999 
corr(d,y) 
-0.42 -0.87 -0.93 -0.95 -0.97 -0.98  0.99 0.88 0.69 0.55 0.32 0.06 
corr(c,y) 0.77 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53  1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 
 
   
 
      
 
  l (output elasticity of capital) 
 0.10 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65  0.10 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.65 
corr(d,y) 
-0.89 -0.94 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95  0.61 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.66 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.49  1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.90 
 
             
x (the quarterly trend growth rate of effective labor) 
 1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00  1.00 1.005 1.50 2.00 3.00 5.00 
corr(d,y) 
-0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95  0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
             T (the depreciation rate, note that we assume the calibration is in a quarterly model) 
Annual rate 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.60  0.06 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.60 
Quarterly rate 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 0.150  0.015 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100 0.150 
corr(d,y) 
-0.96 -0.95 -0.93 -0.91 -0.84 -0.78  0.70 0.55 0.42 0.35 0.23 0.19 
corr(c,y) 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.78  0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 
 
 
 
      
 
     (the persistence of time-series technology shocks) 
 0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00  0.00 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 
corr(d,y) 
-1.00 -1.00 -0.99 -0.95 -0.92 -0.85  -0.97 -0.93 -0.09 0.55 0.62 0.62 
corr(c,y) 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.55 0.61 0.67  0.73 0.77 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
              0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100  0.001 0.003 0.00712 0.010 0.025 0.100 
corr(d,y) 
-0.95 -0.95 -0.95 0.95 -0.95 -0.95  0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
corr(c,y) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
             & (habit persistence) 
 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99  0.00 0.25 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.99 
corr(d,y) 
-0.98 -0.96 -0.95 -0.95 -0.97 -1.00  1.00 1.00 0.96 0.55 -0.03 -0.99 
corr(c,y) 0.96 0.93 0.85 0.55 0.39 0.10  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.29 
 
             * (time devoted to provide labor) 
 0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99  0.05 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.99 
corr(d,y) 
-0.96 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95  0.74 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.21 -0.20 
corr(c,y) 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55  0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.90 
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Note: This table reports the correlations of the growth of dividends and consumption with GDP 
growth by varying the range of the parameter values for the VM-CAC model. 
